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The Task of the Philosopher
In Place of an Introduction
Sebastian Truskolaski and Jan Sieber
1 Whenever the concept of a task appears in Benjamin’s writings, readers can be sure that
the author is referring to a particular task – a task which, we will find, determines his
project in a fundamental way. The most prominent elucidation hereof can be found in
“The Task of the Translator” (1921-23), Benjamin’s famous preface to his translation of
Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens. There he argues that “[i]t is the task of the translator to
release in his own language that pure language which is exiled among alien tongues.”1 As
so often, Benjamin’s enigmatic phrasing echoes his own earlier formulations: “the task of
students”,2 in his early reflections on “The Life of Students” (1914-15); “the poetic task”,3
in a piece from the same year, titled “Two Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin” (1914-15); “the
task […] of naming things”,4 in his celebrated language-philosophical tract, “On Language
as such and the Language of Man” (1916); “the task of the coming philosophy”,5 in his
essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” (1918); “the task of the criticism of
art”,6 in his doctoral dissertation on The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism
(1919); and “the task of a critique of violence”,7 in his work on the “Critique of Violence”
(1921). The concept of the task thus appears to be of central importance in Benjamin’s
early, theological-metaphysical writings – a set of works that is often seen as culminating
with the publication of his ill-fated Habilitationsschrift, Origin of the German Mourning Play
(1924-25/1928).8 Later on, the task comes to be replaced by other concepts and motifs,
such as the destructive character’s labour of demolition.9 It returns eventually, and with
considerable  prominence,  in  Benjamin’s  final  work,  the  theses  “On  the  Concept  of
History” (1940), which describe the “task to brush history against the grain”,10 the “task
to bring about a real state of emergency”,11 and “the task of liberation in the name of
generations of the downtrodden”.12 Despite the varied contexts in which the concept of
the task appears, and despite the numerous agents, acts, and themes to which it is linked,
the general, conceptual function that Benjamin attributes to this figure is surprisingly
consistent. It signals the demand for a new “language-philosophical foundation for the
metaphysics of experience”, as Werner Hamacher has put it;13 a philosophy of history
that tacitly emerges from a confrontation between Kant and Neo-Kantianism, Classicism
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and Romanticism, a theologically inflected Anarchism and a radically recast vision of
historical materialism.
2 It is for this reason that the concept of the task appears as an ideal starting point for the
subsequent remarks, which aim to frame a collection of essays on Benjamin’s philosophy –
a philosophy that is often hidden between the lines of his diverse, seemingly un- or even
anti-systematic  writings.  As  editors  we  take  it  that  this  publication  marks  a  timely
intervention  into  the  current  state  of  Benjamin-reception.  After  all,  attempts  to
foreground  Benjamin’s  philosophy  have  remained  relatively  few  and  far  between,
especially when compared with the steadily growing number of publications concerned
to cast him in a variety of other roles: from Weimar broadcaster to “Marxist Rabbi”, as
Andrew Benjamin has put it.14 It  is  our conceit,  however,  that it  is  – above all  – the
philosophical character of Benjamin’s work, which holds together its seemingly disparate
strands.  One  way  in  which  extant  studies  have  sought  to  highlight  this  ostensible
coherence  has  been  by  comparing  different  concepts  from  Benjamin’s  philosophical
household on the basis of their general function, outlining a meta-theoretical schema for
philosophical thought as it develops between his early writings and his later works. On
this  basis,  it  became  possible  to  scrutinize  the  many  references  to  the  history  of
philosophy that run through Benjamin’s work – from Plato to Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche,
Cohen  and  Husserl  (to  name  only  a  few  central  players).  However,  whilst  the
immeasurable  philological  and  intellectual-historical  merit  of  such  works  is  beyond
dispute, the aim of this introduction (and the collection it serves to frame) is a different
one: to begin to define what, for Benjamin, was not simply a task of philosophy, but the
task of the philosopher.
3 To this end, it is worth highlighting that Benjamin makes several references to the “task
of the philosopher” in the so-called “Epistemo-Critical  Prologue” to his study on the
Origin of the German Mourning Play.15 Insofar as the “Prologue” has long been viewed as a
transitional  point  between the early theological-metaphysical  writings,  and the later,
more self-consciously materialist works, Benjamin’s formulation is consequential because
it invites speculation as to the overall character of his philosophical programme. From
this perspective, the following reflections – written in lieu of a conventional foreword –
focus largely on the “Prologue”, beginning with the question what relation to philosophy
is being proposed in this dense and cryptic text. More pointedly: if the “Prologue” sets
out to define ‘the task of the philosopher’, does it – in fact – perform the task that it
describes?
4 There  are  at  least  two  ways  of  answering  the  question  regarding  the  relation  to
philosophy laid out in the “Prologue” to Benjamin’s study on the Baroque mourning play.
On the one hand, it might be argued that the text has a merely propaedeutic function.
From this viewpoint the “Prologue” does not perform ‘the task of the philosopher’, so
much  as  it  explains  it  from  the  outside  by  setting  the  epistemo-criticial  stage  for
Benjamin’s interpretation of the German Trauerspiel. ‘The task of the philosopher’ would
thus appear as a theory of philosophical thought. However, such a reading surely misses
Benjamin’s  extraordinary  sensitivity  to  the  ways  in  which  traditional  philosophical
propaedeutics,  such  as  Kant’s,  unduly  restricted  the  parameters  of  experience  –  a
problem with which the young Benjamin had extensively concerned himself. On the other
hand, then, a more productive and interesting solution presents itself. On this reading,
the “Prologue” does not merely present a theory of philosophical thought, but rather
stages,  performs  and  enacts  ‘the  task  of  the  philosopher’.  From this  viewpoint,  the
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“Prologue” has  to  be read as  positing the existence of  an idea of  philosophy,  whose
presentation – Darstellung16 – must become ‘the task of the philosopher’. In this case, the
presentation of philosophy’s idea comes to determine its form and method, its relation to
science and art,  its  account of  the relation between knowledge and truth,  being and
thought,  phenomena and ideas,  and – significantly  –  its  concept  of  history,  all  as  it
pertains to philosophy’s own historical now.
5 In light of this short gloss, it remains to explore Benjamin’s philosophical ‘task’ under five
central aspects: i.) His account of the annihilation of the subject; ii.) His account of the
task’s  two-fold  character;  iii.)  His  account  of  the  role  of  language  in  the  task’s
formulation; iv.) His account of the significance of origins and the world of phenomena;
v.) And, finally, his account of the link between the theory of ideas and the figure of the
monad.
6 i.) Who is ‘the’ philosopher? The idiom of a task might lead one to assume that there must
be a subject of philosophical thought. However, as is well known, Benjamin – from his
earliest writings – engaged in a fierce critique of the concept of a self-conscious, knowing
subject. As he argues, the problem with such a conception of subjecthood arises from a
perceived deficiency of Kantian philosophy, namely its limited concept of experience.17 In
his essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy”, for instance, Benjamin argues that
Kant accounted for the timeless validity of knowledge,  but not for the certainty of a
singularly temporal experience – an experience that encompasses what, for Kant himself,
was  nothing  less  than  the  Enlightenment  itself.  Instead,  Benjamin  charges,  Kant
uncritically adopted an older view, which associates experience with pure or empirical
consciousness, thus putting it in the service of mere knowledge. The task of the coming
philosophy, therefore, “is, according to the typology of Kantian thought, to undertake the
epistemological foundation of a higher concept of experience”18 – an experience which, in
turn, is the condition for what the “Prologue” describes as “truth”.19 The formulation of
such a higher concept of experience depends on the revision of the Kantian concept of
knowledge – as distinct from a re-valorised conception of truth – and the annihilation of
its  metaphysical  elements.  The  most  important  of  these  elements  are  “first,  Kant’s
conception of  knowledge as  a  relation between some sort  of  subjects  and objects  or
subject and object […]; and, second, the relation of knowledge and experience to human
empirical  consciousness”.20 For  Benjamin  the  concept  of  the  subject  as  cognising
consciousness, in opposition to an object of knowledge – a notion formed in analogy to
empirical  consciousness  –  is  the  mythological  substrate  of  Kantian  and  pre-Kantian
epistemology. This “subject nature”21 has to be annihilated by philosophy in order to
arrive  at  a  de-subjectified  concept  of  a  pure  epistemological  (transcendental)
consciousness22; in his earlier essay, “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man”,
Benjamin assigns this role to language, a point to which we will return in due course.
Without  presuming to adequately summarise this  point  here,  it  suffices  to note that
Benjamin’s  critique of  Kant questions the traditional  opposition between subject  and
object,  and hence the subject’s  claim to knowledge and consciousness,  as  well  as  its
intentionality, i.e. its possessive character. Benjamin’s subject, if it were possible to speak
of one, would be a voided subject,  dispossessed, stripped of the a priori conditions of
experience assigned to it by Kant. It would be a decentralised subject: the effect of an
experience, rather than the condition of its possibility. It would be an operation in the
weakest sense, albeit one with profound consequences, insofar as it would become the
bearer of a truth that it does not possess, a truth that it does not know.
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7 Nevertheless,  the  question  remains:  who  is  the  philosopher  whose  task  Benjamin
describes? This philosopher, as we have seen, cannot assume a position outside of history,
from which she could give an objective account of the supra-temporal legitimacy of some
self-same subject’s thoughts or actions. On the contrary, the philosopher is subjected to
historical experience, an experience whose truth it is her task to present. Accordingly,
Benjamin’s philosopher is one who is in search of truth, a truth that does not belong to
any subject or any object, but rather resides in a constellation of being whose legibility
depends on the ‘now’ of a temporal, historical experience.23 To bring forth this truth is a
central facet of ‘the task of the philosopher’.
8 ii.) Having thus given some indication as to how one might figure the ostensible subject of
Benjamin’s task, let us explore the task’s double character. If, as Benjamin suggests in the
“Prologue”, truth resides in a constellation of being, rather than, say, in the seamless
correspondence of  subject and predicate,  then it  follows that this truth is,  above all,
relational. If we concede this point, then the philosopher’s task appears as a constructive
one: to establish this relation between the world of ideas and the empirical world. The
‘task of the philosopher’ would thus have to be twofold: on the one hand, to present – 
darstellen – the world of ideas; on the other hand, to engage with the empirical world in
such a way that it would enter and dissolve into the former – a process that Benjamin
describes  as  Rettung (rescue).  It  is  worth  emphasising  that  the  double  nature  of
Benjamin’s task lets the philosopher occupy
an elevated position between that of the scientist and the artist. The latter sketches
a  restricted  image  of  the  world  of  ideas,  which,  because  it  is  conceived  as  a
metaphor, is at all times definitive. The scientist arranges the world with a view to
its  dispersal  in the realm of  ideas,  by dividing it  from within into concepts.  He
shares the philosopher's interest in the elimination of the merely empirical; while
the artist shares with the philosopher the task of presentation.24
9 By positioning the philosopher between the scientist and the artist, this passage recalls
the entire history of rivalries, alliances, and struggles between philosophy, science, and
art. In Benjamin’s account of their relation, it is not philosophy’s task to legitimate the
objectivity of scientific knowledge, as Kant would have had it; nor is art the organon of
philosophy, as it had been for the Jena Romantics; nor, finally, is philosophy the sublation
of art as a lower form of spirit, as Hegel had argued. For Benjamin, philosophy does not
relate to science and art as distinct objects of philosophical inquiry. Philosophy itself has
both a scientific and an aesthetic dimension. ‘The scientist’ and ‘the artist’ are not mere
metaphors; rather, they stand in for two correlative methodological aspects of ‘the task of
the philosopher’: to engage the empirical world in the manner of the scientist, and – at
the same time – to present the world of ideas in the manner of the artist.
10 The scientific dimension of this task concerns the compilation of the empirical world by
means of the concept. As Benjamin argues,
Phenomena do not […] enter into the realm of ideas whole, in their crude empirical
state, adulterated by appearances, but only in their basic elements, redeemed. They
are divested of their false unity so that, thus divided, they might partake of the
genuine  unity  of  truth.  In  this  their  division,  phenomena  are  subordinate  to
concepts, for it is the latter which effect the resolution of objects into their
constituent elements.25
11 Contrary to Kant’s epistemology, the concept’s function is not to establish logical unity.
Truth, for Benjamin, does not reside in a systematically completed, scientific knowledge
of the empirical world. Rather, such knowledge is portrayed as an illusion common to
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many modern scientific theories, which attempt to unify the field of scientific disciplines.
Instead,  Benjamin  suggests,  the  irreconcilability  of  disciplines  in  fact  resembles  the
“discontinuous structure of the world of ideas”.26 Such irreconcilability could help in the
presentation of ideas, if it were not for science’s hubristic desire to grasp truth as an
encyclopaedic accumulation of data points. In opposition to the scientific demand for
systematic  coherence,  the  function  of  the  concept  in  Benjamin’s  outline  of  the
philosopher’s task is to divide the empirical world – to dissolve it into its elements. Only
in its  dividing function does  the concept  take on the mediating role  through which
phenomena partake in the existence of ideas. Accordingly, Benjamin writes:
As  the  salvation  of  phenomena  by  means  of  ideas  takes  place,  so  too  does  the
presentation of ideas through the medium of empirical reality. For ideas are not
presented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete
elements in the concept: as the configuration of these elements.27
12 These  elements  manifest  themselves  most  clearly  in  extremes,  and,  therefore,  the
concept takes the extreme as its starting point for a more thorough penetration of the
empirical. Nevertheless, such a division of the empirical world in the concept is never
merely a destructive act. Rather, it is a gathering of elements that is directed towards
presenting the idea and, hence, truth. From the standpoint of science, ‘the task of the
philosopher’, then, lies in dividing and dispersing the empirical world in the concept as
the  condition  of  the  possibility  for  its  correlation  with  the  world  of  ideas.  The
philosopher,  by  means  of  the  concept,  destructs the  false  unity  of  the  world,  thus
liberating  it  from its  imaginary  totality.  Accordingly,  the  world  –  dissolved  into  its
elements – may partake in the presentation of ideas.
13 Such a presentation of ideas constitutes the other side of philosopher’s task, namely the
side that it shares with art. The question of presentation, here, is itself twofold: on the
one hand, it concerns the form of presentation; on the other hand, it concerns that which
is to be presented. The problem of form is never resolved once and for all; time and again
it must be at the heart of the philosopher’s task. By the same token, philosophical form
can neither be mathematically constructed, nor can it concern didactic intentions. It is
neither identical with the classical view of philosophical systems, nor with the idea of an
instructive guide for understanding. Philosophy can neither anticipate its form, nor its
means of communicating with others. In other words, presentation is not merely a means
for  the  purposes  of  systematic,  comprehensible  exposition.  Accordingly,  Benjamin
suggests, the question of presentation is best addressed when philosophy assumes the
form a treatise. As he writes, the method of the treatise
is  essentially  presentation.  Method  is  a  digression.  Presentation  as  such  is  the
methodological nature of the treatise. The absence of an uninterrupted purposeful
structure is its primary characteristic. Tirelessly the process of thinking makes new
beginnings,  returning in a roundabout way to its  original object.  This continual
pausing for breath is the mode most proper to the process of contemplation. For by
pursuing  different  levels  of  meaning  in  its  examination  of  one  single  object  it
receives both the incentive to begin again and the justification for its  irregular
rhythm.28
14 Discontinuity  and  repetition  are  the  two  main  characteristics  of  philosophical  form.
Thought  assumes  these  traits  if  it  truly  immerses  itself  in  its  subject  matter.  Such
philosophical writing has a particular prosaic rhythm. At times it comes to a standstill,
begins anew, or jumps between disparate elements.
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15 While this aspect of form correlates with the divisive task of the scientist, the concern
with that which is to be presented puts philosophy into the orbit of the artist. Like the
artist, the philosopher envisions an image of the world of ideas – an image which ‘is at all
times definitive’. This philosophical image does not intend validity beyond its own time,
but rather yields temporal, historical truth. It presents the world of ideas in the medium
of the empirical. However, this does not mean that the empirical world, divided into its
elements by the concept, is mere material for the philosophical image. What is at stake in
the task of presentation is,  firstly,  Benjamin’s differentiation between knowledge and
truth, and, secondly, his peculiar view of the relation between ideas and phenomena.
With regards to the former, knowledge and truth differ in their respective relations to
their objects. Knowledge treats its objects as property, as Benjamin puts it.
Knowledge is possession. Its very object is determined by the fact that it must be
taken possession of – even if in a transcendental sense – in the consciousness. The
quality of possession remains. For the thing possessed, presentation is secondary; it
does not have prior existence as something presenting itself.29 
16 Once again,  Benjamin formulates his critique of scientific knowledge in opposition to
Kantian epistemology. Producing knowledge in a Kantian sense is, for Benjamin, a form of
appropriation that captures its object as property. Whatever can be registered and made
coherent according to the a priori categories of understanding, and the corresponding
forms  of  intuition,  is  seized  by  consciousness.  ‘Method’,  then,  is  a  mere  means  of
appropriation. Objects are never taken on their own terms; they are subordinated to the
rule of  reason.  For truth,  however,  presentation is a primary concern.  In contrast to
knowledge, truth is self-presentation; not the product of a logical appropriation of an
external object, but immanent to the method of the object’s elaboration. As Benjamin
states with reference to Plato’s theory of ideas: “[t]he object of knowledge is not identical
with the truth”.30 With regards to the question of unity, this pertains to both knowledge
and truth, albeit in very different ways. The unity of knowledge means the conceptual
coherence  of  individual  insights  constituted  through  the  application  of  its  formal
method.  Put  differently,  the unity of  knowledge is  not  determined by the individual
phenomena  that  it  appropriates,  but  by  the  method  of  their  appropriation  in
consciousness. By contrast, the unity of truth is derived from being. It is unmediated/
immediate: a unity in being, not a unity in the concept. As such, it is not a unity of being,
which has been forgotten in the course of history, or hidden behind the false appearance
of an alienated world, as it had been for Heidegger.31 
17 The philosopher’s double task, then, is to dissolve the empirical into its elements, albeit
not in order to unveil or reveal some underlying reality. Truth’s unity is in being. It means
a unity integral to truth, which cannot be turned into an external object for thought. As
Benjamin highlights, the unity of truth “is not open to question”.32 For if truth had an
answer to the question of its own unity, then this answer would already imply a unity of a
different sort – a unity other than the one contained in the answer given. Every such
answer would therefore necessarily lead to the repetition of the question that produced
it. Truth, in this regard, is unity as being, as Benjamin goes on to suggest. However, as
remains to be seen, this being is not essential; rather, it is historical.
18 The second aspect of the ‘task’, noted above, is to do with Benjamin’s characterisation of
the being of ideas. As in the case of truth, ideas are said to exist; however, unlike truth,
they are given.  “ldeas are pre-existent”,33 Benjamin argues,  they are ein Vorgegebenes.
Herein  resides  Benjamin’s  peculiar  Platonism,  which  he  deploys  to  correct  certain
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perceived  failings  of  Kant’s  epistemology.  However,  Benjamin’s  ontology  of  ideas  is
eccentrically coloured by his own theologico-metaphysical  philosophy of language,  as
well  as  motifs  borrowed from Leibniz’s  Monadology.  (A brief  discussion of  Benjamin’s
relation to Leibniz will follow in due course.) For the time being, it suffices to note the
following: if truth, as Plato argues in the Symposium, guarantees the being of beauty, i.e. if
truth is the content of beauty, then, Benjamin argues, the same holds true for the being of
ideas.  Truth neither discloses a content,  nor does it  expose a secret.  Just  as truth is
inextricably linked to beauty qua semblance, so it is immanent to the presentation of
ideas – and here Benjamin departs from Plato – that it appears as a configuration of
conceptually mediated, phenomenal elements. But how do phenomena and ideas relate to
each other in the first place? Phenomena are not,  as Benjamin stresses,  contained in
ideas. Ideas are rather their “objective interpretation”.34 This, however, does not mean
that they act as their concepts or laws. Ideas neither serve the knowledge of phenomena,
nor do phenomena simply attest to the existence of the ideas.  Phenomena and ideas
belong to fundamentally different realms. Just as phenomena are not contained in ideas,
ideas are not given in the world of phenomena. Therefore they cannot be made into the
objects of intellectual vision, intellectual intuition. Ideas elude any kind of intentional
grasp.  Thus  Benjamin argues,  “[t]ruth does  not  enter  into  relationships,  particularly
intentional ones.”35 Rather than entering into a relation – e.g. when a subject intends to
tell the truth – truth is the relation between phenomena and ideas. If ideas are ‘objective
interpretations’, insofar as they put phenomena (or rather their elements) in relation to
each other, i.e. if they construct constellations, then truth means a particular correlation
between the empirical world, and the world of ideas – a correlation through which the
empirical divests itself of its mere phenomenality, thus exposing an image of the idea. If
Benjamin’s view suggests a kind of correlationism, then this does not mean a coincidence
of  thought  and  objects.  (After  all,  as  we  have  seen,  Benjamin  blurs  the  boundaries
between conventional accounts of subject-object dialectics.) The inessential correlation
between phenomena and ideas appears in what Benjamin describes elsewhere as a ‘now’.
“Truth resides in the “now of knowability.”36 This correlation of phenomena and ideas in
a ‘now’, in turn, is mediated through language. Language and history thus appear as the
media of philosophical thought.
19 In sum: it is the double ‘task of the philosopher’ to engage the empirical world in the
manner of the scientist, and – at the same time – to present the world of ideas in the
manner of the artist. The philosopher destructs the false unity of the empirical world and
dissolves it into its elements by means of the concept, so that an image of the world of
ideas  may  appear  as  a  constellation  of  these  elements.  The  possibility  of  such  an
interpretation of the world in the order of ideas, however, is grounded in language and
history.
20 iii.) Benjamin’s reflections on the correlation between phenomena and ideas stem from
another  important  aspect  of  his  philosophy,  namely:  his  philosophy  of  language.
Philosophical  thought  is,  for  Benjamin,  fundamentally  dependent  on  language.
Accordingly he argues that 
It  is  the task of the philosopher to restore,  by presentation,  the primacy of the
symbolic character of the word, in which the idea is given self-consciousness, and
that is the opposite of all outwardly-directed communication. Since philosophy may
not  presume to  speak  in  the  tones  of  revelation,  this  can  only  be  achieved  by
recalling in memory the primordial form of perception.37
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21 Once again, Benjamin draws on ideas first articulated in earlier works – chiefly his essays
“The Task of the Translator”, “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man”, as well
as several posthumously published fragments on perception. The task of presenting ideas
is thus framed in terms of his philosophy of language: the restoration of ‘the symbolic
character of the word’, through ‘presentation’ – Darstellung – elevates the idea to ‘self-
consciousness’  in  a  manner  that  is  diametrically  opposed  to  ‘all  outwardly-directed
communication’ – an undertaking that, in turn, relates to ‘memory’ and, moreover, to a
‘primordial form of perception’, albeit in ways that Benjamin does not fully elaborate
here.38
22 It  is  worth  emphasising  the  following:  since  his  earliest  writings,  Benjamin  sharply
criticised an understanding of language in terms of ‘outwardly-directed’ communication.
What is more, he equates the dictate of communication with a “bourgeois” paradigm that
tends  to  instrumentalise  language  as  a  means  to  an  end.39 By  contrast,  he  suggests,
language ‘communicates’ nothing but itself: “all language communicates itself in itself”,
not through itself; “it is in the purest sense the ‘medium’ of communication.”40 At the
same time, though, Benjamin distances himself from an esoteric view of language as an
end in itself,  by criticising an unspecified “mystical theory”, according to which “the
word is simply the essence of the thing.”41 Along these axes, Benjamin sketches a theory
of “pure language”, set against the backdrop of the biblical story of genesis.42 To this
effect, in his 1916 essay “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man”, he portrays
Adam as the first philosopher – the recipient of the creative “gift of language”,43 which
names creation into being.  After  the  expulsion from Paradise,  however,  the creative
power of Adamitic language is compromised. This is why the ideational dimension of
language remains inaccessible, and ‘philosophy may not presume to speak in tones of
revelation’. Echoing Johann Georg Hamann’s account of creation as a trace of God’s divine
word, Benjamin describes a mute language of nature, which demands ‘translation’: “the
translation of the language of things into that of man”.44 Such a translation, however,
does not  mean the mere transposition of  one post-lapsarian tongue into another,  as
Benjamin  elaborates  in  “The  Task  of  the  Translator”;  nor  does  it  mean  a  direct
articulation of the word’s ‘symbolic character’, as though it simply spoke through things
themselves.  The  question thus  arises  as  to  how Benjamin proposes  to  relate  to  ‘the
symbolic character of the word’, the realm of ideas, from this Babel-esque standpoint?
23 In terms of the “Prologue” one might argue as follows: if, in his 1916 essay, Benjamin
portrays  Adam  rather  than,  say,  Socrates,  as  the  ‘first’  philosopher,  because  Adam
receives the ‘gift of language’ from God; if, in turn, he argues that a mute language speaks
through nature as the residue of God’s creative word, and that this language – for its part
– demands ‘translation’,  albeit  in a highly qualified sense,  then the relation between
language, the ‘task’ of presenting ideas, and an expanded concept of experience begins to
come into focus. As Samuel Weber observes, “‘[t]he task of philosophy’ – since it cannot
claim to reveal directly – consists in a certain kind of originary listening […] that in turn
entails remembrance.  Through such remembering”, Weber continues,  “words are ‘once
again’  given  the  ability  to  ‘reassert  their  rights  to  name.’  This  is  why”,  he  argues,
“neologisms – which also entail a certain naming – are to be avoided: for by introducing
new words, they ignore the historical memory of language.” 45 Put another way, ‘it is the
task of the philosopher to restore […] the primacy of the symbolic character of the word’
qua name, because only in the name is the idea raised to the level of ‘self-consciousness’
through  the  process  of  presentation.  However,  since,  following  the  expulsion  from
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Paradise, ‘philosophy may not presume to speak in the tones of revelation’, this can only
be achieved negatively: by circumscribing a ‘primordial form of perception’, which once
partook in the realm of ideas. Benjamin, in other words, does not simply purport to name
ideas into being;  rather,  he outlines  a  language-philosophical  model  for constructing
constellations of  objects through which ideas may yet be experienced at  the level  of
language.  For Benjamin,  then,  language serves as the privileged model  of  experience
because  it  disrupts  the  tidy  distinctions  of  the  Kantian system,  including those  that
differentiate between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of sensation. “Language”, in other words,
“serves  as  a  medium  of  experience”,  the  quasi-transcendental  mediator  between
phenomena  and  ideas,  which  “binds  the  ostensible  ‘subject’  and  ‘object’  in  a  more
profound […] relationship of underlying kinship.”46
24 iv.) If language is the mediating instance between the world of ideas and the world of
phenomena, then history is the site upon which this mediation manifests itself as origin.
As is well known, Benjamin’s concept of origin rejects any facile historicism, which
conceives of history as a linear progression through time. Writing history, on this model,
amounts to nothing more than the projection of distinctions and similarities between
historical  ‘facts’  into  a  pseudo-logical  continuum. True historiography,  for  Benjamin,
begins where the deductive method is abandoned and thought becomes absorbed in the
singular phenomenon wherein it unfolds its truth-content. The same holds true for ‘the
task of the philosopher’. “The world of philosophical thought does not […] evolve out of
the continuum of conceptual deductions, but in a description of the world of ideas. To
execute this description it is necessary to treat every idea as an original one.”47 It’s the
task of philosophical contemplation to immerse itself in the empirical so as to rediscover
it  as  the  origin  of the  idea.  Hence  the  concept  of  origin  is,  as  Benjamin stresses,  a
historical category. It does not, however, designate the origin of a development. ‘Origin’
does not describe the first moment from which something takes its course. Accordingly,
discovering  an  origin  in  history  does  not  mean  tracing  a  historical  development
backwards to where it is supposed to have begun. Rather, origin is where the historical
continuum is interrupted. It is in the moment of a ‘now’, which is not logically deducible
from historical facts, but rather changes its own past and subsequent history (Vor- und
Nachgeschichte). As the twofold nature of ‘the task of the philosopher’ suggests, things
only reveal  themselves  as  origins  under  a  dual  kind of  scrutiny.  To present  an idea
requires  the  immersion into  the  singular.  At  the  same time as  the  philosopher-qua-
scientist destructs the false unity of the empirical world, and dissolves it into its elements
by means of the concept,  she destructs the false continuum of history and immerses
herself in the singular fact. Accordingly, Benjamin writes:
Indeed this is where the task of the investigator begins, for he cannot regard such a
fact as certain until its innermost structure appears to be so essential as to reveal it
as an origin. The authentic – the hallmark of origin in phenomena – is the object of
discovery,  a  discovery which is  connected in  a  unique way with the  process  of
recognition.48
25 The  authenticity  of  historical  facts,  once  more,  does  not  consist  in  their  logical
connection.  Rather,  it  derives  from their  innermost  structure.  Something appears  as
authentic inasmuch as it is governed by a dialectics of uniqueness and repetition. Origin
is where a unique singularity escapes the historical continuum and reveals itself as the
site of remembrance of the idea.
26 For Benjamin, true history – beyond the superimposition of a pseudo-logical continuum –
is  discontinuous.  But  it  is  not  the  universal,  the  idea,  that  gathers  and sublates  the
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discontinuous  elements  of  history.  On  the  contrary,  only  in  the  discontinuities  that
appear  in  the  ideological  unity  of  historical  progression  the  idea  presents  itself.
Therefore, philosophical history has to become a “science of the origin”,49 which reveals
the configuration of the idea in the discontinuous, the singular, the extreme. It is ‘the
task of the philosopher’, as a historian of origins, to blast open the false continuum of
history in order to rediscover the idea in the singular occurrence.
27 v.) Finally, in the latter part of the ‘Prologue’, Benjamin likens ideas to monads:
And so the real world could well constitute a task, in the sense that it would be a
question  of  penetrating  so  deeply  into  everything  real  as  to  reveal  thereby  an
objective interpretation of the world. In the light of such a task of penetration it is
not  surprising that  the philosopher of  the Monadology was also the founder of
infinitesimal calculus. The idea is a monad – that means briefly: every idea contains
the image of the world. The purpose of the presentation of the idea is nothing less
than an abbreviated outline of this image of the world.50
28 Benjamin’s  formulation  is  striking  because  it  gives  some  important  clues  as  to  the
provenance of his theory of ideas. Accordingly, it is worth emphasising that, in addition
to the broadly Platonic issues debated in the “Prologue”, Benjamin’s description of the
world as a ‘task’, and his references to both the Monadology and to infinitesimal calculus,
situates him squarely in the midst of early 20th-century Leibniz reception – particularly as
advanced by Hermann Cohen,  Heinz Heimsoeth,  and other figures from the Marburg
School  of  Neo-Kantianism.51 In  this  regard,  Benjamin’s  suggestion  that  the  ‘task’  of
‘penetrating  so  deeply  into  everything  real  as  to  reveal  thereby  an  objective
interpretation of the world’ gives cause for pause. What is meant by objectivity in the
context of a discussion of ideas, how does interpretative depth ensure such objectivity,
and how does this relate to Leibniz?
29  The former question concerns Benjamin’s attempt, in the “Prologue”, to elaborate an
ontology of ideas,  that is,  to ascribe to ideas a particular mode of being.  As we have
alluded to, this follows from his essay on “The Program of the Coming Philosophy”, which
sought to collapse the distinction between categories and ideas in order to extend the
purportedly  limited Kantian concept  of  experience  to  infinity.  As  we have  seen,  the
unconditioned objects of ideas were thus to become possible objects of experience, at
least indirectly so; but to forge such access to the world of ideas, and hence to truth,
Benjamin  has  to  elaborate  on  the  mode  of  their  existence  –  their  ‘objectivity’.
Nevertheless, insofar as Benjamin – like Kant, but unlike the Jena Romantics – denies that
there can be any intellectual intuition of the unconditioned content of ideas, this relation
must be mediated in some sense through knowledge, i.e. through the very relation of
possession that obtains in conventional subject-object dialectics, and which Benjamin so
vehemently  criticised.  But  how  is  one  to  conceive  of  an  ‘objective’  relation  to  the
unconditioned from the standpoint of the post-lapsarian world of the Baroque mourning
play? In other  words,  how is  one to conceive of  the infinite  from the standpoint  of
profane finitude? Or, put another way, how is one to conceive of a new form of totality
that  is  not  merely  the sum of  truncated singularities  which have been more or  less
violently subsumed under larger conceptual headings?
30 It has already been suggested that the “Prologue” articulates two possible models for
thinking this relation: one in terms of the dual operation of construction and interpretation
(ideas are expressed through configurations of objects, which are raised to the level of
experience through a  process  of  interpretation,  so  that  their  elements  are  ‘rescued’,
albeit  in  slightly  mysterious  ways);  the  other  in  terms  of  language (the  paradoxical
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remembrance of a condition in which the ideational content of the word may yet be
raised to the level of experience, although – again – in highly qualified ways). In a sense,
then, the allusion to Leibniz can be seen to bridge these two ‘models’, insofar as Benjamin
appears to view the monad as expressing an “immanent infinity”.52 As Paula Schwebel
argues,  Benjamin  reads  Leibniz’s  contraction  of  infinity  within  finite  beings  as  the
consequence  of  a  historical  tendency,  which  he  places  under  the  heading  of
secularisation. Accordingly, the monad is supposed to express “an unfulfilled yearning for
transcendence”  in  a  fallen  world,  which  is  “forcibly  redirected  toward  contingent
nature.”53 Infinity  thus  endures  in  the  world  through  what  Schwebel  describes  as
Benjamin’s “inverted metaphysics”.54 In spite of the fact that “reason is denied access to
the transcendence of the heavens”, as Schwebel puts it, “in its pursuit of a fundamental
grounding  for  contingent  experience,  thinking  is  drawn  into  an  abyss  of  infinite
analysis”.55 This translates into the terms of our exposition as follows: for Benjamin the
unity  of  an  individual  constellation,  which  is  constructed  through  a  process  of
interpretation,  mirrors  the  unity  of  an  idea,  which  is  –  in  turn  –  an  abbreviated
expression  of  infinity  ‘within  finite  beings’.  This  is  all  the  more  striking  since,  as
Schwebel  suggests,  Benjamin  maps  Leibniz’s  foremost  mathematical  innovation  –
infinitesimal calculus – onto his account of the secularisation of history in the period
following the 30 Years War. As she argues, Benjamin seeks to explain this development in
terms of a “transformation of the meaning of creation, from a temporal stage on the way
to salvation, to the immanent totality of what is.”56 In this respect, Benjamin views the
breakthrough of infinitesimal calculus as residing “in its transformation of infinity, from
endless succession (a temporal notion) to an infinity of detail within (spatial) presence.”57
This is to say, by establishing a connection between the ‘task’ of presenting ideas in the
guise of monads, on the one hand, and reading their abridged infinities in terms of a
historical shift apparently facilitated by Leibnizian calculus, on the other, Benjamin is
able to articulate one of the his central philosophical concerns: that history, far from
being a mere aggregate of infinitely proliferating points, is ‘an infinity of detail within
(spatial) presence’ – an infinity that demands a labour of interpretation to actualise its
hidden correspondences in the eruptive ‘now’ articulated in his mature writings.
31 We have seen, then, some aspects of how Benjamin proposes to raise ideas (not least, the
idea of history) to the level of experience through the philosophical task of presentation.
By way of summarising the above, let us return to the general question posed at the
outset:  how are  we to  understand the ‘task of  the  philosopher’  as  it  appears  in  the
“Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to Benjamin’s study on the Origin of the German Mourning Play
–  the  pivotal  point  between his  early  writings,  and his  later  works?  If,  as  has  been
suggested,  Benjamin’s  “Prologue” seeks to perform the task of  presenting the idea of
philosophy, then this task must be read as an attempt to rescue philosophical thought
under  the  historical  conditions of  modernity;  to  rescue  it  from the  hubris  of  a  self-
transparent subject, the impoverishment of experience, the degradation of language to a
mere instrument of communication, the reduction of truth to a system of knowledge and
knowledge to a matter of possession, the abolition of history as a disposable accumulation
of historical data points, and the distortion of the world through its subsumption under
the value-form. Under these conditions, a systematic idea of philosophy (with strong,
stable  concepts  of  subject  and  object,  reason,  totality,  and  so  on)  can  no  longer  be
uncritically affirmed. Philosophy has to take upon itself the task to disempower the self-
transparent subject, to wrest truth from knowledge, to discover the non-instrumental,
non-signifying dimension of  language,  and to  introduce breaks  and fissures  into  the
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seemingly continuous connectedness of the world, and of history. Moreover, in order to
perform this task, it must renounce all aspirations to systematic completeness, and take
on the form of a treatise (Traktat) – an essayistic form that yields truth by destroying the
false unity of the empirical world, and by presenting the idea within a constellation of
profane  elements.  If  philosophical  thought  is  to  be  rescued,  it  has  to  perform  a
paradoxical task – a paradox that is captured by the double meaning of the German word
Aufgabe, which, as Paul De Man has pointed out, means both ‘task’ and ‘abandonment’ or
‘giving  up’.58 Accordingly,  we  might  say  –  following  Benjamin  –  that  ‘the  task  of
philosophy’  is  (self-)abandonment:  die  Aufgabe  der  Philosophie  ist  es  sich  aufzugeben.
Benjamin’s “Prologue” thus performs the task of presenting the idea of philosophy as the
paradoxical  task  of  the  philosopher.  Philosophy  thus  rescues  philosophical  thought,
albeit in a different form, namely as Critical Theory.
32 With our special edition of Anthropology & Materialism we want to contribute to the on-
going efforts  to  read Benjamin’s  Critical  Theory philosophically.  This  does  not  mean
retreating behind Benjamin’s ‘rescue’ of philosophy by simply inscribing him into the
history of ideas. On the contrary! We are convinced that Benjamin’s philosophy holds
important lessons for philosophy today at a time of continuing intellectual, cultural, and
political  crisis.  In  our  view,  Benjamin’s  reflections  on  the  philosophical  problems  of
subjectivity,  experience,  language,  knowledge,  truth,  history and politics  must  be re-
translated  into  the  language  of  current  struggles.  The  enduring  fascination  with
Benjamin  as  a  tragic  hero  of  modernity  has,  for  many  years,  caused  both  a  ‘bad’
academisation of  his  work and a glib commercialization – even fetishisation – of  his
biography. Whereas the former consigns him to the formalised, institutional realms that
he resisted (or that resisted him) during his lifetime, the latter tends to see in him little
more than feuilletonistic fodder – a whimsical rebel of yesteryear. In each case what is
forgotten is the imperative character of Benjamin’s task. As Sami Khatib puts it in his
contribution to the present volume, “instead of assimilating Benjamin to our times and
reading our present into Benjamin’s own historical present, our task is rather to read a
Benjaminian text that was never written in the first place. Here, our historical distance to
Benjamin’s  time appears  as  a  connection through disconnection.  It  is  only this  truly
historical discontinuity that we ‘share’ with Benjamin and the ‘tradition of the oppressed’.”
59 With this in mind, we hope that the contributions collected in the present volume will
prove to be illuminating.
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